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PROFERT OF THE PERSON.
In the early history of English law the rule
was that accused persoi.s were compelled to
answer to any criminal charge brought against
them. The practice was akin to denying to
a prisoner the right to be defended at his
trial, or to exculpate himself by the testi-
mony of witnesses-a practice derived from
the civil law.' But 'all this gradually was
changed, and. nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum
became a maxim of the law. This maxim
has been incorporated into the fundamental
law, and established in the Constitution of
the United States, as well as in those of the
several States, when it has been espressly
provided that no accused person shall be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself in any
criminal case.
Can the courts order a person accused of
crime to make profert of his person-to sub-
mit to a compulsory examination of his per-
son-or would this be, in effect, compelling
him to give evidence against himself, and
therefore a violation of his constitutional
rights? This is an interesting question,
which has been somewhat considered by the
courts, but still seems unsettled and debata-
ble.
In 1858, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina, in what is known as Jacob's Case, 2 held
that a defendant could not be compelled to
exhibit himself to the inspection of a jury
for the purpose of enabling them to deter-
mine his status as a free negro. And in 1872,
in Johnson's Case,3 the above ruling was ap-
proved by the same court. Two years later
the question was again before this court in
Garrett's Case. 4 In that case it appeared
that the defendant had stated to persons
present on the night of the homicide that the
deceased came to her death by her clothes
accidentally catching fire while the deceased
was asleep, and that she, the defendant, in
attempting to put out the flames burnt one of
her hands. At the coroner's inquest, the de-
fendant was compelled to unwrap the hand
which she had stated was burnt, and exhibit
it to a physician in order that he might see
1 See 4 Blackstone. 855, 359.
25 Jones, 259.
367 N. C., 58.
4 71N. C., 58.
whether there was any indication of burn up-
on it. And it was held that the actual condi-
tion of her hand, although she was ordered
by the coroner to exhibit it to the doctor, was
inadmissible evidence. Jacob's Case was
distinguished as follows: "The distinction
between that and our case is, that in Jacob's
Case, the prisoner himself, on trial, was com-
pelled to exhibit himself to the jury, that
they might see that he was within the prohib-
ited degree of color, thus he was forced to
become a witness against himself. This was
held to be eiror. In our case, not the pris-
oner, but the witnesses, were called to prove
what they saw upon inspecting the prisoner's
hand, although that inspection was obtained
by intimidation." In Nevada it has been
held that the court could lawfully compel a
criminal defendant, against his objection, to
exhibit his bare arm, for the purpose of de-
termining whether it had on it certain tatoo
marks. The question of identity was raised,
and a witness had testified that he knew the
defendant, and knew that he had tatoo marks,
which he described, on his right fore-arm.
The case is among the best considered, per-
haps is thebest considered,of those sustaining
a similar view of this subject. It is worth
while to quote from it as follows: "The ob-
ject of every criminal trial is to ascertain the
truth. The Constitution prohibits the State
from compelling a defendant to be a witness
against himself, because it was believed that
he might, by the flattery of hope, or suspicion
of fear, be induced to tell a falsehood. .None
of the many reasons urged against the rack,
or torture, or against the rule compelling a
man to be a witness against himself, can be
urged against the act of compelling a defend-
ant, upon a criminal trial, tp bare his arm in
the presence of the jury so as to enable them
to discover whether or not a certain mark
could be seen imprinted thereon. Such an
examination could not, in the very nature of
things, lead to a falsehood. In fact, its only
object is to discover the truth; and it would
be a sad commentary upon the wisdom of the
framers of our Constitution to say that by
the adoption of such a clause they have ef-
fectually closed the door of investigation
tending to establish the truth. Confessions
of persons accused of crime, whenever ob-
tained by the influence of hope or fear, are
excluded, because in, comsidering the motive
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which actuate the mind of man, they might
be induced to make a false statement. Tht,
notwithstanding the universality of this rule
-6f law, whenever the confession, however im-
properly or illegally obtained, has led to the
discovery of any given fact, that fact is al-
ways admitted in evidence, because the rea-
sons which would -have excluded the confes-
sion no longer exist. This is the governing
.and controlling principle of the law. The
Con.stitution means just what a fair aild rea-
sonable interpretation of its language im-
ports. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness, that is, to testify, against himself.
'To use the common phrase, it 'closes the
-mouth' of the prisoner. A defendant in a
criminal case can not be compelled to give
evidence under oath or affirmation, or make
-any statement for the purpose of proving or
disproving any question at issue before any
tribunal, court, judge or magistrate. This is
the shield under which he is protected by the
strong, arm of the law, and this protection
was given, not for the purpose of evading
the truth, but, as before stated, for the rea-
son thak in the sound judgmedt of the men
-who framed the Constitution, it was thought
that owing to the weakness of human nature
and the various motives that actuate man-
kind, a defendant accused of crime might be
-empted to give testimony against himself
that was not true." 5
This i3 certainly a strong presentation of
this side of the question, and we confess that
we do not see how the application of the prin-
ciple for which the court contends in any way
infringes on any right which is essential to
t h protection of innocent persons unjustly
accused. Courts and legislatures have gone
.quite far enough in the line of making it next
to impossible to convict in criminal cases.
In a cane decided in the Court of Appeals
.of Texas in 1879, this question was present-
ed, although in a different form, but a simi-
Iar conclusion was reached to that announced
above. The prisoner was on.trial for murder,
anl the prosecution proved that loot-prints
were found on the premises where the murder
had been committed, and was allowed to
prove over the objection of the defense, that
the examining magistrate compelled the de-
hState v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79; s. c., 1 Crim. Law
M[ag., 634.
fendant to make his foot-prints in an ash-
heap, and that the foot-prints so made cor-
responded with those found on the premises
whlere the homicide was committed. Coun-
cil argued that if the prisoner could be com-
pelled to make an impression with*his foot in
order to see whether it was similar to that
made by the foot of the person who com-
mitted the crime, then if he were charged
with forgery he could be compelled to take a
pen and write, in order to see if his hand-
writing was similar to that of the party who
had committed the forgery. And this it is
said he may now be compelled to do by stat-
ute in England. 6 But the court declared
that this was no violation of the constitution-
al privilege that one accused of crime shall
not be compelled to give evidence against
himself.7
And so in North Carolina it was held in
1876, that an officer who had made the arrest
and compelled the prisoner to put his foot in a
track found near where the larceny was com-
mitted, could testify to the result of the coin-
parison thus made. s But, on-the same facts, a
different conclusion was reached in Georgia 9 in
1879, no r eference being made to cases else-
where decided; and in Tennessee in 1876,
where a pan of soft inud was brought into
the court room on the trial and the prisoner
was asked, in the presence of the jury, to put
his foot into it, which he declined to do.
The case was reversed for the reason that the
prisoner was asked in the presence of the
jury to make evidence against himself, and
that his refusal improperly influenced the
jury.' 0
In New York a similar view was taken of
this question. The subject was there pre-
sented in a case which involved the question
whether the prisoner'had been delivered of a
child. The coroner directed two physicians
to go to the jail where the woman was Im-
prisoned, and examine her breasts and pri-
vate parts, for the purpose of dctermining
-whether she had recently been delivered of a
child. She denied having been pregnant,
and objected to being examined by the phy-
6 See 22 Alb. L. J., 145.
7 Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App., 245, 265.
8 State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646; s. C., 21 Am. Rep.
493.
9 Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667.
10 Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. 519; s. C., 30 Am. R. 72.
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sicians. But on being told that if she did
not voluntarily submit to the examination
force would be used and she would be com-
pelled to submit, she yielded, and the physic-
ians examined her private parts with a spec-
ulum, amd also made an examination of her
breasts. The court, however, refused to al-
low them to testify to the opinion which they
formed from the examination in question,
and declared that such an examination was in
violation of the spirit and meaning of the
constitutional provision that no person should
be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. "They might as
well have sworn the prisoner and compelled
her, by threats, to testify that she had been
pregnant and been delivered of the child, as.
to have compelled her, by threats, to allow
-them to look into her person with the aid of a
speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
15regnant, and been recently delivered of a,,
child." 11
And a similar view of this question has
been taken in a case lately decided in the Su-
preme Court of.Georgia. In that case, the
question was whether the prisoner could be
compelled by order and command of the
court tolmake profert of his person so that a
witness'could be enabled to testify, from per-
sonal inspection, as to the character and ex-
tent of the amputation of the prisoner's right
led. The prisoner was on trial for murder,
and a material and important part of the tes-
timony against him was the character of the
track and signs made'the night of the murder
by the one who, in the dark, approached the
house where the deceased was, and fired the
fatal shot. Thesa tracks indicated that -the
murderer had but one leg, and the character
of the other print upon the ground depended
materially upon the chajacter of the amputa-
tion of the other limb. And it was for the
purpose of establishing the correspondence
between the amputated limb and the prints
on the ground, that the prisoner was ordered
to make~profert of his limb to a witness. It
was held that the evidence of the witness
based on such profert could not be re-
oeived. 12
It appears, therefore, that there is a deci-
ded conflict in the cases on the question.
11 People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 216.
1i Blackwell v. State, 8 Crim. Law Mag. 394.
The courts of North Carolina, Nevada and
Texas have recognized the right of the court
to compel a prisoner to make profert of his
person, while this right has been denied in
New York, Georgia and Tennessee. But if
the court can not admit the testimony of phy-
sicians who have made a compulsory examin-
ation of the person of a prisoner, is there any
right to admit the testimony of police officers
who have made a compulsory search of his
person, as to counterfeit money or any other
indicia of crime which they may have found
concealed on his person. This is every day's
practice, and yet it is difficult to see wherein
such testimony differs from that of medical
experts who have examined his person. It
would seem that if such testimony is in the
one case compelling the prisoner to give evi-
dence against himself, it is equally so in the
other. But it is the opinion of the writer
that in neither case is such testimony to be
considered as a violation of any constitutional
right which the prisoner possesses. Whether
the court can compel a person to submit to
an examination by physicians in a civil action,
is a vastly different question. And it has
been held that the court may order such a
compulsory examination of the person of the
plaintiff, in an action for damages for injuries
done to the person. The Supreme Court of
Iowa has lately held that in such cases fhe
court may, on the application of the defend-
ant, order the plaintiff to submit his person
to an examination by physicians and surgeons
for the purpose of ascertaining the character
and extent of the injuries alleged. The court
declared in this case that the refusal of the
plaintiff to submit to an examination so -or-
dered, would render the party liable to pun-
ishment for contempt of court, and that if
refusal was continued so long as to effectively
obstruct the progress of the case, all allega-
tions as to personal injuries might be stricken
from the pleadings. "Under the explicit di-
rections of the court, the physicians should
have been restrained from imperilling in any
degree the life or health of the plaintiff. The
use of anaesthetics, opiates or drugs of any
kind, should have been forbidden, if, indeed,
it had been proposed, and it should have pre-
scribed that he should be subjected to no
tests painful in their character." 13
18 Schroeder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 375.
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Wherever impotency has been acknowl-
edged as an impediment to marriage, the
courts have compelled the parties in proceed-
ings to obtain a decree of nullity, to submit
their persons to an examination by medical
experts, whenever such an examination was
necessary for the purpose of determining the
fact of impotency. This arises from the ne-
cessity of the case, especially in the case of
females; for impotency on the part of the fe-
male, which can not be cured by proper med-
ical treatment or a surgical -operation, is
pronounced to be rare. And divorce for the
impotency of the female is limited to cases of
an impervious or supposed impervious vagina,
from an .original malformation or the effect
of some supervening infirmity or disease, as
mere sterility is not sufficient ground for a
decree of nullity. "From the very nature of
the case, it appears to be impossible to ascer-
tain the fact of incurable impotency, especi-
ally4in those cases where the husband is the
complaining party, except by a proper sur-
gical examination by skillful and competent
surgeons in connection with other testi-
mony. * * * * And I have no doubt
as to the power of this court to compel the
parties, in such a suit, to submit to a surgical
examination, whenever it is necessary to as-
certain facts which are essential to the proper
decision of the case."' 14 As it is essential
that the impotency should be incurable, 15 it
is necessary that the fact of incurability
should be made out by the evidence of meat-
ical experts who have made a personal exam-
ination of the party whose impotency is
alleged. The right of the court to order such
an examination, ard the necessity for making
such an order, can no longer be considered
as involved in any doubt whatever.' 6 And
when the wife is the plaintiff, and the libel
states her to have been a spinster at the time
of the marriage, it is usual to order an in-
spection of her person as well as that of the
husband, because her virginity and capacity
implies his impotency.1 7
14 Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 554.
15 Brown v. Brown, 1 Haggard, 523.
.16Briggs v. Morgan, 3 Phillimore, 825; Welde v.
Welde, 2 Lee, 580; H- v. P- (L. R.), 3 Prob. & Div.
126; G-v. G- (L. R.), Prob. & Div. 287; Newell v.
Newell, 9 Paige, 26.
17 Coote's Eec. Pr. 867. And see Norton v. Seton, 3
Phillimore, 147.
According to the English practice, the in-
spection was intrusted to three medical ex-
perts, either two physicians and a surgeon, or
two surgeons and a physician; the adverse
party having the privilege of naming one or
more.' 5 In this country we find Chancellor
Walworth declaring that the examination
should be made by "physicians of intelligence
or skill, who, by study or practice, have made
themselves well acquainted with the nature
and progress of the disease which has caused
the defendant's present incapacity."' 19 And
in this same case the Chancellor said: "The
defendant must therefore submit to such an
examination by one or more respectable gen-
tlemen of the medical profession, who may
be named for that purpose by the husband,
with the sanction of the court. * * * *
Such medical attendants as she may think
proper to call in are also to be present at the
time of her examination by the complainant's
professional witnesses." In another case in
the same court it is said that in the selection
of the experts, due regard will be paid to the
feelings and wishes of the defendant. 20 In
an English case, decided as early as 1730,
the case of Welde v. Welde, 21 the inspection
of the wife was made by midwives, while that
of the husband was made by physicians duly
appointed by the court for that purpose. And
in all cases a proper respect for the feelings
of the party to be examined requires that the
number of experts appointed by the court to
make the examination, should be restricted
to the smallest number consistent with the
interests of justice.
There may be cases, however, of alleged
impotency, in which the court will not feel
under any necessity to order a personal ex-
amination of the party to be made. When
the party against whom impotency is alleged,
has already submitted to an examination of
competent physicians, whose testimony can
be readily obtained, it is said *that a further
examination will not be insisted on by the
court. 22 Btit where the wife claimed that her
incapacity existed at the time of the trial, but
18 Coote's Ecc. Pr. 388. And see Dean v. Aveling,
1 Robertson, 279.
19 Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 26.
20 Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 541, 558.
21 2 Lee, 580.
22 Brown v. Browin, 1 Haggard, 528, note a; Deven-
bagh v. Devenbagh, 5 Paige, 5546 556
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not at the time of the marriagc. and to prove
her claim produced the certificate of two tied-
ical gentlemen who had examined her recent-
ly, expressing their belief that her incapacity
had arisen since the marriage, Chancellor
Walworth, upon the application of the hus-
band, ordered that she should submit to an-
other examination at the hands of experts
:appointed by the court, declaring that under
tlie peculiar circumstances of the case, the
•complainant ought not to le compelled to
leave the decision of his cause to rest solely
,ul)on an ex parte examination made by physi-
-cians who bad been selected for the purpose
-by the wife herself.
23
The husband must, of course, furnish all
-the necessaay funds to pay the expen'fes of
-the surgical examination.24  And if the wife
refuses to submit herself to the examination
-ordered by the Court, the allow:ance of her al-
omony m.y be stupended until she conse.ts
to the examination as directed.2 r5 And either
pau-ty refusing to submit to such an examina-
tion might undoubtedly be punished for con-
tempt of court. 2 6 But as a refusal to submit
to the examination has been regarded as evi-
dence of incapaCity, 27 a party will ordinarily
hesitate long before refusing compliance with
the order of the court in such cases.
And after the medical experts have made
-their examination of the person according to
the direclion of the court, and given ill their
uestimony, such testimony is to be received
and weighed with great caution, and Sir Johr
Nichol has gone so far as to declare that he
is "not aware that it has ever been held suf-
ficient alone" to justify the court in granting
a decree of nullity.2 s  There ought to be
other evidence to supplement that given by
the medical witnesses, in order to justify a
court in annuling a marriage on the ground
-of the impotency of one of the parties.
HENRY WADE ROGEiRs.
"'2 Newelt v. Newell, 9 i'aige, 26.
21 Devenbagh v. Deverbiagh. 5 laige, 554, 558.
25 Newell v. Newel, 9 Paige. 26.
26 See Schroeder v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 47 Iowa,
:35.
27 Harrison v. Harrison, 4 Moore P. C. 96, 103; Lord
"lrourhami Is Opinion. See. too, H-v. P- (1. I.), 3
I'r,)h. & Div. 126. The court shohl ihe satistied, how-
,ever, that theie was no collusim hi-elweej tihe parti,-s.
Pollard v. Wvyb,,rn, 1 fagg. Eccles. 72.5; Sparrow
-i. ilarrison, 3 Curtis. 16.
2. Norton v. SeLon, 3 Phillimore, 147.
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSANITY
CASES.
The increasing tendency of counsel re-
tained in a case to rely upon the defense of
insanity to accomplish an acquittal of tke
prisoner, and the latitude allowed them in in-
troducing experts to testify to the prisoners
insanity, and now especially the favor with
which jurics regard such experts, has given
rise to numerous adjudications upon the sub-
ject of who should be competent to testify in
relation to the prisoner's sanity or insanity.
And the cases involving similar questions aris-
ing in contests as to the condition of a testa-
tor's mind are also numerous. When. expert
testimony was first introduced in trials
great deference war paid to* it, for the rea-
son, no doubt, that an expert called as a wit-
ness represented the science as to which he
was called to testify, and on account of his
familiarity with it, having made it a study,
he was recognized as being a better witness
than those not specially skilled in his art.
But of late this belief that an expert was
more credible than nn ordinary witness, has
been in a great many cases destroyed. One
thing in particular has tended to disabuse the
minds of jurors that greater reliance should
be placed upon the testimony of Experts than
that of ordinary witnesses, and that is, at the
present time, the practice is to remunerate
experts in proportion to the importance of
th5 teslimony they are to give. If, for in-
stance, an expert were to receive a large fee
for his testimony in a required case, it is ob-
vious his mind would be more or less biased
in favor of the side by which he was called
to testify. When a witness comes into court
to testify in scientific matters, it should in a
measure affect his ci-edibility, if he has ac-
cepted a relainer sufficient to bias his opinion.
Lord Campbell, in Tracy Peerage,' says that
"skilled witnesses come with such a bias on
their minds to support the cause in which
they are embarked, that hardly any weight
should be given to their evidence." 2
A jury might well be suspicious of an at-
torney who testified in his own case, and the
1 10C. &Fin., 154.
2 S,.e, also, Gay v. Life TrIs. Co.. 2 Big. 14; Brebm
v R. Co.. 34 B tr. 256; Grig4ry v. Water Co.. 40
Cal. 396; Winans v. R. Co., 21 I1ow. 101; Watson v.
Anderson, 13 Ala. 202.
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